John O'Dea :: PhD Thesis


	Sensory Qualities: An Indexical Route to a Dispositional Account J. W. O’Dea B.A. (Hons) A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Monash University Melbourne, Australia. December, 2001 Concise Table of Contents Abstract Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction Part One –Methodological 1. Kind Words –Kripke vs. Jackson? 1.1 Necessity and Manifest Kinds 1.2 Kripke’s historical view of natural kind words 1.3 Jackson and Two-Dimensionalism 2. The Indispensability of Ordinary Conceptions 2.1 Physicalisms A Priori and A Posteriori 2.2 Byrne and “Cosmic Hermeneutics” 2.3 The Status of Folk Theories Part Two –Conceptual 3. Against Primitive Sensory Concepts 3.1 “Consciousness” as a Primitive Concept 3.2 The “No Conceptual Analysis” Argument against Physicalism 3.3 An Appended Topic-Neutral Reply 3.4 The Kripkean Objection, and a Reply 4. An Indexical Theory of Sensory Concepts 4.1 Privacy and the Problem of the Inverted Spectrum 4.2 The dual-nature accounts of sensory concepts 4.3 Sensory Concepts As Indexical Part Three –Metaphysical 5. A Dispositional Theory of Sensory Qualities 5.1 The Explanatory Gap: Conceptual Version 5.2 The Explanatory Gap: Empirical Version 5.3 Representationism, Higher-Order Perception, and Sensory Qualities 5.4 A Dispositional Account 5.5 Further Issues Conclusion Bibliography Full Table of Contents Abstract Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction Part One –Methodological 1. Kind Words –Kripke vs. Jackson? 1.1 Necessity and Manifest Kinds 1.1.2 Rigid designation 1.1.3 Natural kind words as name-like 1.2 Kripke’s historical view of natural kind words 1.2.1 Naming the kinds 1.2.2 Necessary versus contingent properties 1.2.3 The necessity in associated descriptions 1.3 Jackson and Two-Dimensionalism 1.3.1 The basic idea 1.3.2 Kind words as rigidified descriptions 1.3.3 Jackson on two-dimensionalism and conceptual analysis 1.3.4 The respects in which Kripke and Jackson agree 2. The Indispensability of Ordinary Conceptions 2.1 Physicalisms A Priori and A Posteriori 2.1.1 Physicalism as an entirely scientific matter 2.1.2 Why scientific criteria are not independent of everyday criteria 2.1.3 Ordinary conceptions and the historical view of reference 2.1.4 Knowing about water, and knowing about “water” 2.2 Byrne and “Cosmic Hermeneutics” 2.2.1 The objection from the logical gap between distinct vocabularies 2.2.2 The solution: overlapping vocabularies 2.3 The Status of Folk Theories 2.3.1 Block and Stalnaker against a priori knowledge of manifest kinds 2.3.2 Knowledge of manifest kinds as “Moorean” knowledge Part Two –Conceptual 3. Against Primitive Sensory Concepts 3.1 “Consciousness” as a Primitive Concept 3.1.1 Prologue: resolving conceptual disputes 3.1.2 The received view 3.1.3 Chalmers on phenomenal qualities 3.2 The “No Conceptual Analysis” Argument against Physicalism 3.2.1 The argument, briefly 3.2.2 Criteria and explanation 3.1.3 Why knowing when we’re “conscious” must involve criteria 3.3 An Appended Topic-Neutral Reply 3.3.1 The topic-neutral analysis of sensory terms 3.3.2 Chalmers’ rejection 3.3.3 A Representationist Solution 3.4 The Kripkean Objection, and a Reply 3.4.1 Kripke’s attack on physicalism 3.4.2 Sensory qualities and the intermediary role 3.4.3 Evidence as the real intermediary 3.4.4 Identifying sensations in other people 3.4.5 Combining the first-person and third-person criteria 4. An Indexical Theory of Sensory Concepts 4.1 Privacy and the Problem of the Inverted Spectrum 4.1.1 The problem 4.1.2 Could “green sensation” be disjunctive? 4.1.3 Could “green sensation” be ambiguous? 4.1.4 “Green sensation” as indexical: the proposal 4.2 The dual-nature accounts of sensory concepts 4.2.1 “Feels like this” and the splitting of sensory concepts 4.2.2 Loar and Tye on sensory concepts as recognitional 4.2.3 Block on P-consciousness 4.2.4 Papineau's first-person concepts and Nagel’s partial rejection 4.3 Sensory Concepts As Indexical 4.3.1 Demonstrating sensory states 4.3.2 The beetle in the box. 4.3.3 Public names for ‘private’ objects